

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	USSR (Georgian SSR)	REPORT	[REDACTED]	25X1
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This is UNEVALUATED Information

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] significance of the recent trial and sentencing of Georgian police officials, Rukhadze, Rapava, Tsereteli, Khazan, Krinyan, Savitskiy, Paramanov, and Nadaraya, [REDACTED] the trial had no connection with possible current maneuvering among top-level Soviet leaders, nor with any future maneuvering against one or another of the current leaders. [REDACTED] the trials had more local than Union-wide significance, and might be used in Georgia in the future as ammunition for changes and transferrals of officials there. [REDACTED] Georgian nationalism, as well as nationalist traits in other Transcaucasian republics, was still a serious problem and [REDACTED] the trial and the announcement of it were partially meant as a warning to such groups. 25X1
2. [REDACTED] the fact that the announcement was carried only on the local Tbilisi radio in Georgian and published only in the Georgian Republic newspaper, Zarya Vostoka, [REDACTED] the Government might be trying to conceal the fact that serious anti-government business was afoot and that possibly the Georgians, who have had a record of hating the Russians while Stalin was alive, hated the Russians even more now that Stalin was dead. [REDACTED] the trial would be described in a secret Party document sent to the central committees of all the republics, wherein an expanded explanation of the affair would be offered and a clear moral drawn. [REDACTED] besides tying the nefarious activities of the six executed officials to Beriya, thus providing a further justification for the action against him as well as against these six, the accusations would stress nationalist tendencies of the purged, and their attempts to place the interests of Georgia, as they saw them, above the interests of the Soviet Union. [REDACTED] the moral would be that the regime is making an example of these men and that officials in the other republics who have similar ideas should take heed. 25X1

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(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#")

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3. [redacted] the long lag between the arrest of these officials, for some at least two and one-half years ago, and their execution at this time. When Beriya was arrested a large number of his cohorts and followers were also arrested. The regime was interested in making the largest impression possible through trials and executions of these police officials. In order to do that they have spaced out the executions over many years, thereby keeping the perfidy of Beriya and the misuse of police power before the public eye, rather than expending all their ammunition at once. Arrests, transfers, and disappearances still take place but the regime would like to drive home the concept that illegal police activity and unbridled terror are no longer permitted. Government action in this case, as in the case of Beriya, Ryumin, and Abakumov, serves to illustrate this to the people. Furthermore, the regime is concerned about alienating the Georgians more than is necessary. If they were to have shot all these persons at once, it would have rebounded against them in the Caucasus. Stalin, who was a Georgian, died in 1953. Soon after, Beriya, another Georgian, and many of his henchmen who were Georgians were purged. The regime might have felt that if these other Georgians were also shot at that time the people of Georgia would have felt that they were being persecuted. 25X1
4. [redacted] Beriya was well liked by the Georgians. [redacted] three or four months before Stalin's death, three or four thousand Georgians were purged. These people were accused of "nationalist action" and of maintaining connections with nationalist elements in Turkey and Iran. The purge was carried out by MGB personnel sent from Moscow for this purpose. The accused were sent to Siberia and were allowed to take with them only 50 kilograms of personal belongings. When Beriya became Minister of the MVD after Stalin's death, he reversed this purge, ordering the people released and compensated for their losses. For actions such as these, Beriya was looked on with favor by the Georgians. It is necessary for the regime to show Georgians that Beriya really was their enemy, that he persecuted Georgians as well as others, and that his memory is to be despised rather than revered. 25X1  
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5. [redacted] the names of Ordzhonikidze and Orakhelashvili were brought into the trial. As in the Beriya indictment, the presence of Ordzhonikidze's name was to indicate that there are good Georgians as well as those of Beriya's stripe, and that, in his rise to power, Beriya took advantage of his position and power to terrorize these Georgians as well as other Soviet citizens. [redacted] Ordzhonikidze's wife and son lived in Moscow and that they were well treated. Like the families of Zhdanov and Kalinin, Ordzhonikidze's family was provided with personal guards from the MVD, with a car, chauffeur, maids, and other servants. Authorization from the Politburo was required for this, indicating either that Ordzhonikidze's family was never persecuted, as the indictment against the Georgians states, or that if an attempt was made it failed. 25X1  
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6. In the case of Orakhelashvili, who was shot during the 1930 purges as an enemy of the people, [redacted] he was included in the indictment in question to attract Georgians to the side of the regime. The intent here is to win over those disaffected Georgians who feel that Georgians in times past have been unfairly dealt with, by blaming Beriya for many of the purges. Since Stalin still can not be blamed, Beriya is used as the scapegoat. 25X1
7. [redacted] there can be no doubt that the arrest and execution of someone as powerful as Orakhelashvili, who was a full member of the All-Union Central Committee in 1927 and 1930, would require Stalin's personal approval. [redacted] During the purges of the 1930's, dossiers of compromising material were kept in the NKVD's files. At that time Yezhov was head of the NKVD and he, or later Beriya, might have 25X1

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suggested a name to Stalin as that of a dangerous man, but Stalin's permission would be necessary to carry out the execution. The Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee apparatus kept dossiers on people only in regard to their jobs, their transfers, their abilities, but not in regard to their political reliability. [redacted] Malenkov, since his work at that time was in the Personnel Directorate, would not have been instrumental in finger- ing possible subversives. Beriya, after he became chief of the NKVD, on the other hand, might have. Beriya was always a vindictive person, preferred yes-men around him, and would have used any opportunity to get rid of those he did not like, who had crossed him, or who would not act as yes-men. He, therefore, was undoubtedly responsible for many deaths, and since he had a particular interest in Transcaucasia his influence there would have been strongly felt. Therefore, [redacted] the manner in which the indict- ment of the Georgians was phrased can be interpreted to show that a move at this time is underway to remove Malenkov once and for all from the political scene.

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[redacted] the latter would be kept "on the scene" for a year or so and, if no great change was effectuated within the collective leadership, gradually would be relegated to positions of less and less importance. However [redacted] not [redacted] "disappear" since this was not in keeping with the tactics of the "new style leadership".


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1. [redacted] Comment: The announcement of the sentencing to death of the first six and to imprisonment of the last two was made on 22 November 1955.

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